We consider electricity generation industries where thermal operators imperfectly compete with hydro operators that manage a (scarce) water stock stored in reservoirs over a natural cycle. We explore how the exercise of intertemporal market power a¤ects social welfare and environmental quality. We show that, as compared to the outcome of spot markets, long-term contracting either exacerbates or alleviates price distortions, depending upon the consumption pattern over the water cycle. Moreover, it induces a second-order environmental e¤ect that, in the presence of a thermal competitive fringe, is critically related to the thermal market shares in the di¤erent periods of the cycle. We conclude by providing policy insights.
1 Introduction no seasonality. However, thermal plants use fuels like gas and coal, and thus generate negative environmental externalities.
New Zealand is a particularly good example of a country displaying a power-generation mix with these characteristics. Indeed, in New Zealand, electricity is essentially produced by a thermal …rm (22% gas and 12% coal) and a State-owned Enterprise (ECNZ) that manages the two major reservoir-storage systems, comprised of a series of dams and powerhouses mainly located on the rivers (55%) : This is not the sole example though. In America, a signi…cant amount of hydroelectric-generation capacity (though less important than in New Zealand) coexists with thermal stations in the western U.S. Most hydro plants, concentrated in the Paci…c Northwest and California, are controlled by a single (public) …rm, the Bonneville Power Administration, that is in charge of marketing the electricity produced by federally owned reservoirs along the Columbia River system. Furthermore, roughly 40% of power in the Chilean Sistema Interconectado Central is produced by thermal plants, the reminder is hydro-generated, mainly by rainfall water. In Europe, countries that rely upon a hydro-thermal mix are, for instance, Italy and Finland, where most reservoirs are situated nearby the mountains and …lled by melting snow and ice. In Italy, hydro and thermal plants provide about 13% and 77%; respectively, of total electricity; in Finland, about 19% and 50%; respectively. 8 The markets described above are all imperfectly competitive. From Crampes and Moreaux [7] (CM hereafter) we learn that, in frameworks where electricity is generated by imperfectly competing thermal producers and hydro producers, the market outcome depends on whether or not the latter exert a subtle form of intertemporal market power. Indeed, not only can hydro producers raise scarcity rents by appropriately scheduling water releases over the horizon of the natural cycle (this follows from the overall scarcity of the water reserves together with the possibility to store water at zero operating cost). They can also act as "Stackelberg leaders" vis-à-vis the thermal competitors because time irreversibility (together with the inelasticity and the scarcity of water reserves) provides a natural commitment device for them to produce more in the later periods of the water cycle. Actually, as pointed out by Murphy and Smeers [14] , the former situation is tantamount to having hydro producers sell output under long-term contracts, the whole production pro…le being …xed at the outset of the market game. The latter situation rather mirrors the functioning of spot markets, where hydro producers can revise their strategy in each period.
CM disclose the implications that the hydro producers' strategic behaviour has on to the International Hydropower Association [12] , pump-storage capacity is below 150 GW. This is about 1/6 of the actual installed conventional hydro capacity. We do not consider pump storage because it raises speci…c issues, the analysis of which would be beyond the scope of our study. 8 In New Zealand, the remainder of power comes from geothermal sources, wind and biomass. In Italy, it is produced by wind, photovoltaic and geothermal plants, whereas in Finland it is generated by nuclear stations. the performance of hydro-thermal power oligopolies. They do not consider the problems related to environmental damage, and as such, these problems and consequences are neglected in their studies. In fact, an important characteristics of the thermal process, which is based on the use of hydrocarbons, is that it releases polluting emissions. It follows that, in hydro-thermal electricity markets, not only the strategic behaviour of hydro producers a¤ects social welfare, but also the externalities induced by the thermal activity. 9 It is well known that, in markets where environmental externalities are present, imperfect competition can actually lead to higher social welfare than perfect competition. This is because the exercise of market power acts essentially as an environmental tax, downsizing polluting activities (compare Barnett [3] , for instance). In a similar fashion, the strategic advantage of the hydro producer may be potentially bene…cial, as it can induce a reduction in thermal production. In the context we explore, however, a complication follows from the inelasticity and the scarcity of the water reserve. Indeed, within the water cycle, any increase in hydro production in one period is associated with an equal decrease in another period. Under these circumstances, it is far from obvious to which outcome the interaction between hydro producers'strategic behaviour and environmental externalities will lead.
The ultimate purpose of our work is to study whether, and how, the adoption of longterm contracts a¤ects social welfare and environmental quality in electricity industries with a hydro-thermal generation mix. To do so, we embody the release of thermal emissions into the model of open and closed-loop Cournot competition elaborated by CM. 10 Despite resorting to the same representation, we nonetheless provide a richer interpretation as compared to CM. Similarly to Murphy and Smeers [14] , we interpret open-loop competition as an institutional setting in which output is sold under long-term contracts. By contrast, closed-loop competition, which rather corresponds to a spot market, is here considered to be the equilibrium outcome "in the absence of long-term contracting." 11 On 9 Worldwide institutions are putting increasing emphasis on environmental issues. At the EU level, environmental concerns evidently appear from the extremely rich package of documents published by the European Commission on pollution problems (as a review on this, one can visit the site http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/documents_en.htm). 10 Several authors have modelled open-loop Cournot games to represent imperfect competition in hydrothermal electricity generation with natural storage of water. For the sake of illustration, Arellano [2] considers a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe and a mixed hydro-thermal generating portfolio, Bushnell [6] focuses on a Cournot oligopoly with a competitive fringe in which …rms possess a mixture of hydro and thermal resources. Within the open-loop framework, it emerges that hydro operators can exert static market power (without water withdrawal) by properly choosing how much to use for production in di¤erent periods, depending upon the speci…c market conditions. With respect to this approach, CM push the analysis one step further. Looking at closed-loop games, they highlight that hydro operators can exert a more sophisticated form of intertemporal market power while competing with thermal operators. A comprehensive view of the ways hydro producers exert market power is found in Rangel [15] . The latter also discusses the main competition issues that result from strategic behaviour in electricity systems dominated by hydro generation. 11 Murphy and Smeers [14] study investments in generation capacity in restructured electricity systems.
top of that, we accommodate for the model to capture various possible market structures. More precisely, while CM develop the analysis for the case of a single thermal producer, we allow the thermal activity to be more or less competitive, ranging from the case of a single producer to that of a competitive fringe.
Analogously to CM, we take competition to occur between producers that use two di¤erent technologies. While this is the case in countries like New Zealand, as mentioned, it is not in others, where competition takes place between producers that manage a mix of production processes. However, this does not invalidate our approach. The model we adopt, indeed, may well represent competition between generators whose technological mixes are quite asymmetric. 12 We further abstract from the possibility that nuclear technology may be used. This choice is innocent in that, for the reasons previously illustrated, our analysis would nonetheless apply to situations in which not only hydro and thermal plants but also nuclear plants are active. The message we draw is thus more general than the stylistic simplicity that our model might suggest. Our analysis delivers two main results. The …rst result pertains to the impact of long-term contracting on social welfare. We show that the welfare e¤ects depend upon the speci…c pattern that consumption follows over the water cycle. More precisely, in frameworks where demand peaks at the …rst period of the cycle, long-term contracting enhances welfare. That is, from a social viewpoint, open-loop competition is more desirable than closed-loop competition. By contrast, in frameworks where consumption peaks at the second period after renewal of the water reserve (and demand seasonality is strong enough), long-term contracting results in a hydropower pro…le that yields lower welfare. That is, closed-loop competition is more desirable from a social perspective. In terms of policy, this indicates that longterm contracts are to be promoted in the former kind of situations (…rst-period peak) and discouraged in the latter (second-period peak).
The second result regards the impact of long-term contracting on environmental damages. We …nd that whether or not electricity is sold under long-term contracts it is unlikely to make a signi…cant di¤erence in terms of environmental quality. This follows from the observation that, "in a linear context", water transfers have no impact whatsoever on total thermal production, so that the intertemporal pro…le of hydro-production has only a second-order impact on emissions. To make the picture more precise, we further evi-
They use an open-loop Cournot game to model an oligopoly where capacity is simultaneously built and sold in long-term contracts. They rely upon a closed-loop Cournot game to represent a spot market in which investment decisions are made in the …rst stage and the sales decisions in the second stage. 12 One may think about Chile, for instance. In this country, Compañía General de Electricidad, which uses natural gas to produce electricity, operates in competition with Copec, that generates electricity based on thermal resources, and Colbún, that currently generates 1274 MW of hydropower and 1236 MW of thermal power from fossil fuels. The latter is destined to become a predominantly hydro producer once the HidroAysén project to create …ve additional hydro plants (in joint venture with Endesa) will be completed.
dence that, when the thermal sector turns out to be structured as a competitive fringe (and, hence, environmental concerns are particularly strong), the environmental e¤ects are critically related to the pattern of (thermal) market shares rather than to the pattern of consumption. From a policy viewpoint, it seems impossible to deliver a universal rule for the fully general case. Yet, the environmental e¤ects of long-term contracting can be precisely assessed and we explain how to appraise them by means of simple data.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we …rst describe the model and then present the …rst-and second-best scenarios. In Section 3, we revisit the open-and closed-loop Cournot competition à la CM. In Section 4, we identify the impact of long-term contracting on social welfare and environmental damage. In Section 5, we provide a few policy insights.
The model
We adopt a discrete intertemporal model of Cournot competition in power generation. The model is similar to that of CM with the main novel aspect that environmental externalities are accounted for. The model is also revisited to accommodate for various degrees of competition.
Speci…cally, we suppose that electricity is produced by …rms that use di¤erent technologies. One …rm, that we name "…rm H;" runs hydropower plants. One or more …rms, that we name indi¤erently "sector T " or "…rm T " (referring to the representative thermal …rm), manage thermal plants. 13 All …rms schedule production over a time span of two periods (t = 1; 2) at zero intertemporal discount. The possibility that generation plants will be saturated is neglected.
14 Thermal output at period t is denoted q Hydropower is generated using water stored in reservoirs. The available stock of water, denoted S; is exogenously given as reservoirs are replenished naturally at the beginning of the …rst period. The stock is commonly known in the industry and can be used for production during the …rst and the second period. 15 One unit of water allows …rm H to generate one unit of power. Thus, the …rm faces the intertemporal water constraint
where q H t denotes the quantity of hydropower at period t: As the resource is scarce, constraint (1) holds, in fact, as an equality and no water is left at the end of period 2: In other words, no spillage occurs. To perform the activity, …rm H bears a …xed cost F H :
It incurs no variable cost because the production cost associated with the hydro process does not depend on using water. 16 Electricity is a standardized commodity so that …rms o¤er a homogeneous good. Total utility from consumption of Q t = q
The function u t ( ) is period-speci…c. It is increasing and strictly concave in its argument (u
Environmental externalities do not a¤ect electricity consumption. In each period, the demand for electricity is perfectly known, provided the main part of its yearly variability can be predicted with reasonable accuracy.
First best
We begin by exploring the …rst-best scenario. The social-welfare function is written
Social welfare is the di¤erence between consumer utility and social costs. The latter include the producers' production costs (i.e., the private costs) and the environmental damage (i.e., the external cost). The …rst-best pro…le of output is pinned down by maximizing the social-welfare function subject to (1) . Suppose the …rst-best allocation is an interior solution. 17 Then, it satis…es the set of conditions 15 In practice, water reserves are constituted in some speci…c periods rather than at a speci…c point in time i.e., depending on the source of reservoirs …lling, when rivers are ‡ooding, when it rains intensely, when snow and ice melt. For the purpose of our model, the availability of the reserve over the two periods is important. 16 In the model, only the thermal process is taken to induce externalities. This does not mean that, in practice, the hydro process has no environmental impact. Actually, it does induce soil and site deterioration. Nevertheless, unlike the thermal emissions, the external damage that is provoked by the hydro technology does not depend on the amount of produced output. Because we are interested mainly in the …rms'production strategies, we can neglect the externalities induced by the hydro process. 17 Unless otherwise speci…ed, the focus on interior solutions will be maintained throughout the paper, although welfare maximization may actually call for corner solutions. See CM for a detailed discussion about corner solutions in an environment where externalities are not accounted for. ) is such that, given the optimal hydro output, the period 1 (resp. period 2) marginal utility p 1 (q
)) equals the period 1 (resp. period 2) social marginal cost c where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint, which represents the shadow cost of water. Equation (3) says that, at social optimum, electricity should be equally priced over time. In each period, the energy price should equal the shadow cost of water as well as the social marginal cost of the thermal output. Because the cost, the damage and the emission functions are identical in the two periods, sector T should generate the same amount of power at t = 1; 2: Observe that the demand varies from one period to the other. The hydro producer should thus compensate for these variations, thereby perfectly smoothing the thermal output pro…le.
A graphical illustration of the pro…le of …rst-best prices and quantities, as characterized by condition (3), is provided in Figure 1 . This and the subsequent graphs (except for that in Figure 5 ) are constructed supposing that period 1 is the peak period (i.e., the period in which demand is higher) and period 2 the o¤-peak period (i.e., the period in which demand is lower). In all …gures, the relevant functions are drawn as linear for purely graphical convenience: the linear stylization does not change the main content of the graphs.
Second best
At …rst best, producers may not be able to balance the budget. To account for producers'…nancial concerns, we now investigate a second-best framework.
In principle, in our setting, budget balance could be an issue for any producer, depending upon the relative size of …xed costs. In practice, in electricity markets, production technologies are such that marginal and …xed costs are inversely related. Typically, in the thermal process, the marginal cost is large and the …xed cost relatively small. In the hydro process, instead, the …xed cost is large and the marginal cost (nearly) zero. This suggests that the hydro producer would be more likely to incur …nancial di¢ culties at …rst best. We thus focus on this case in the sequel of the analysis. It is, however, noteworthy that we would obtain qualitatively similar results if we consider a situation in which the thermal sector were exposed to losses at …rst best.
The second-best allocation is pinned down by maximizing (2) subject to (1) and to the constraint H q
which ensures that the pro…t be non-negative for …rm H: Let H be the Lagrange multiplier associated with (4). The second-best quantity pair is characterized by the set of conditions
where s H t q H t =Q t is the market share of the hydro producer in period t; " t (Q t ) p t =p 0 t Q t ; with p 0 t @p t =@Q t ; is the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of market demand in period t and e = 1 + H is a de ‡ated measure of the shadow cost of water. Condition (5a) reveals that, at second best, the price exceeds the social marginal cost of the thermal activity in either period. Indeed, for …rm H to break even, sector
T should obtain a larger-than-…rst-best per-period markup. Condition (5b) shows that the price also exceeds the de ‡ated shadow cost of water in either period. Speci…cally, the price obeys a rule that is similar to the monopoly Ramsey rule. According to (5b), how much the general price level is above …rst best depends upon the size of F H ; which is re ‡ected in the ratio H = 1 + H : On the other hand, the speci…c price level in each period depends on the demand elasticity as well as on the market share of the hydro ) is such that, given the second-best hydro output, the period 1 (resp. period 2) marginal utility p 1 (q
)) is larger than the period 1 (resp. period 2) social marginal cost c producer. That is, ceteris paribus, the price is higher in the period in which the market demand is less elastic. Moreover, to facilitate break-even, it is optimal that …rm H sells relatively more when the price is higher. A graphical illustration of the pro…le of secondbest prices and quantities, as characterized by conditions (5a) and (5b), is provided in Figure 2 .
Combining (5a) and (5b) yields
together with
Condition (6a) shows that, ceteris paribus, the wedge between the second-best prices should be larger the tighter the budget constraint of …rm H: However, condition (6b) further suggests that the divergence in prices comes along with a divergence in social marginal costs. This means that social costs are not minimized. To contain this e¢ -ciency loss, the price di¤erence is to be kept as small as possible by raising both prices.
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Noticeably, this distortion can be completely avoided when the cost, the damage and the emission functions are all linear in quantity. In that case, at second best, the price is raised above the …rst-best level exactly by the same amount in the two periods.
Cournot competition
We now concentrate on the situation in which …rms compete à la Cournot. As …rms do not take externalities into account, the equilibrium strategies in the Cournot duopoly are essentially those described by CM. In what follows, we revisit their analysis to allow for various degrees of market competition. We begin by presenting the open-loop game, in which …rms maximize pro…ts statically. This game mirrors an institutional setting in which output is sold under long-term contracts. We then consider the closed-loop game, in which the hydro producer takes advantage of its ability to commit to a given output pro…le so as to internalize the e¤ects of its current decisions on future performance. We interpret this setting, which is more similar to spot markets, as the equilibrium outcome in the absence of long-term contracts.
The open-loop game
Before analyzing the open-loop game (i.e., competition under long-term contracting), we …nd it useful to look more deeply into the composition of the thermal sector, which we have only brie ‡y presented within the model description. This allows us to illustrate in greater details how the analysis of CM is extended to accommodate for market structures other than the hydro-thermal duopoly they consider.
Sector T (also denominated "…rm T " with reference to the representative thermal …rm) includes n 2 N producers competing à la Cournot. For simplicity, assume that each producer supplies the quantity q t = q of the other …rms as given and chooses output q t ; t = 1; 2; so as to maximize its pro…t function
where e Q t = q H t + (n 1) q t denotes the quantity that is provided, in total, by all the (hydro and thermal) competitors. For each thermal producer, the best response function is written p t +q t p 0 t (q t + e Q t ) c 0 t (q t ) : Thus, the optimal production rule of the representative …rm T is given by
where = 1=n is to be interpreted as a measure of the degree of competition in the thermal sector. Clearly, in each period, the price exceeds the marginal cost as long as > 0; in which case …rm T obtains a positive markup. By contrast, the price is equal to the marginal cost when sector T is a competitive fringe.
The equilibrium price depends on the market demand, so that it does not need to be constant over time. Recall that, by contrast, the …rst-best price re ‡ects only the (social) costs, hence it is constant across periods. Yet, it exceeds the per-period private marginal cost, thereby contributing to incorporating the externality indirectly. This evidences that having the thermal producer exert market power, contributes to alleviating environmental problems.
Firm H also takes the production decisions of …rm T as given and chooses quantity q
Firm H allocates the available water so that marginal revenues are equal across periods and equal to the shadow cost of water. Condition (8) identi…es the intertemporal pro…le of hydropower for any given pro…le of thermal output. It shows that, at the openloop equilibrium, the price exceeds the shadow cost of water at each t: This re ‡ects the bene…ts that …rm H obtains, at the margin, in the two periods. From CM we know that a hydro monopolist allocates water over time so that the peak price is above the …rst-best level whereas the o¤-peak price is below. This intertemporal distortion follows from the circumstance that water is available in a limited amount. 19 In a hydro-thermal 19 Were a large amount of water available, the hydro producer could drive the price above the …rst-best level in either period by withdrawing some water from production. To avoid strategic withdrawal, free disposal is legally banned, in general, in countries where water reserves are copious and hydropower largely predominates. In addition, public authorities make an e¤ort to solicit and di¤use information on reservoir-…lling. For instance, in Norway, starting from December 2002, the Water Resources and Energy Directorate began to provide more detailed information, as compared to the past, about reservoirs …lling in the country. In particular, information about aggregate reservoir levels for four di¤erent regions 
);
i.e., the price attains a higher level in the peak period (t = 1) : oligopoly, the hydro producer is a monopolist vis-à-vis the demand that is not served by the thermal competitors. For a given thermal output pro…le, water is allocated so as to create enough shortage and raise scarcity rents in the peak period. The equilibrium of the open-loop game is graphically illustrated in Figure 3 
The closed-loop game
Recall that, in the kind of situations we consider, water withdrawal does not occur i.e., the hydro producer devotes the entire stock of resource to power generation. Actually, in such situations, once some hydro output is produced in period 1; the hydro output to be produced in period 2 is just what is left out of the water reserve q : This circumstance provides a natural commitment device to …rm H; which can thus act as a replaced information about aggregate reservoir levels for Norway as a whole (Grønli and Costa [8] ). By contrast, if water is scarce enough, water withdrawal is spontaneously avoided, as it would not be pro…table.
"Stackelberg leader" vis-à-vis the thermal competitors. When this occurs, a closed-loop Cournot game unfolds. As already mentioned, the outcome of this game can be viewed as the market outcome in the absence of long-term contracts.
Under closed-loop competition, the quantity pro…le of …rm T still obeys the pro…t-maximizing rule in (7). As for …rm H; pro…t maximization now yields 2 ) will a¤ect that of q T 2 : Speci…cally, …rm H forecasts that any increase in the hydro supply at period 2 will be partially compensated by a decrease in the thermal supply. Thus, for any given thermal output pro…le, it now allocates more water to period 2: It thus exerts a subtle form of intertemporal market power, as evidenced by CM. At the closed-loop equilibrium, one has
This inequality shows that the marginal revenue of …rm H in period 1 exceeds the marginal revenue that …rm H would get in period 2 in an open-loop game. Remarkably, ceteris paribus, the hydro producer is better o¤ at the closed-loop equilibrium because, by accounting for time irreversibility, it is able to take better advantage of the divergence in per-period market conditions. A graphical illustration of the equilibrium of the closed-loop game is provided in Figure 4 .
One might …nd the outcomes previously described, at odds with the functioning of a real-world power generation market, or at least perceive them as a naive view of it. Indeed, given the costs structure, hydro producers usually have priority over thermal producers in the merit order of a deregulated market. One might thus quickly conclude that they will use this advantage to smooth their output pro…le, leaving to the thermal competitors the sole residual demand and the burden to adjust production to demand ‡uctuations. Our analysis evidences that, in fact, a …rm that manages a limited water reserve, stored at no cost, can do better than simply smoothing its production schedule. The adoption of a more pro…table (although time-varying) production pro…le is made possible precisely because the hydro producer can (i) freely store the resource and (ii) release it at any time thanks to the priority it receives in the merit order. 
Long-term contracting, social welfare and environmental externalities
We have seen that the hydro producer can raise its pro…t by transferring water strategically over time. In particular, absent long-term contracting (i.e., under closed-loop competition), …rm H produces less in period 1 and more in period 2. This raises two main questions. First, how does long-term contracting impact social welfare? Second, how does it a¤ect environmental problems?
Replying to these questions requires that we assess whether open-loop competition is more or less desirable than closed-loop competition in terms of both social welfare and environmental quality. However, providing a precise answer is far from obvious as it depends, a priori, on all the relevant markets and technological characteristics. Despite this di¢ culty, it is possible to develop general insights by considering speci…c (and polar) cases.
To reply to the …rst question, we explore a linear framework in which intertemporal water transfer has no impact on environmental damage. This circumstance enables us to highlight the impact of long-term contracting on social welfare net of the environmental externality.
To reply to the second question, we come back to a general setting and look at the polar case in which the hydro producer faces a competitive thermal fringe ( = 0) : This approach is useful in that environmental problems are exacerbated in the absence of market power on the thermal side. In this case, we derive a very simply rule to decide whether long-term contracting would lead to an improvement or, conversely, to a deterioration of environmental health.
The impact of long-term contracting on social welfare
Observe …rst that water transfers are likely to have only a second-order impact on environmental health. More precisely, if the inverse demand curve and the thermal marginal cost in period t = 1; 2 are respectively written
then the intertemporal allocation of water does not a¤ect the total thermal production
The decrease in thermal production that is induced by an increase in hydropower supply in one period is exactly o¤set by the associated increase in thermal production in the other period. 20 In other words, as long as (10) holds true, environmental damages only depend upon Q T ; hence they are not a¤ected by strategic water transfers.
Note that this holds true whatever the degree of market competition in the thermal sector (it does not depend upon ). Thus, it is fair to say that long-term contracting has no …rst-order impact on environmental damages. Of course, there is no reason for which demand and supply should be linear. Yet, by restricting our analysis to the setting here introduced, we can isolate the e¤ects of water transfers (and hence of long-term contracting) on price distortions.
The impact of strategic water allocation is critically related to the market characteristics. More precisely, it depends on whether demand peaks at the …rst or the second period of the water cycle. 21 Given the behaviour of the thermal producers, the socially optimal allocation of water would be such that the electricity price is constant over time. 20 All mathematical details related to this Subsection are relegated to Appendix A. 21 Demand peaks at the …rst period of the water cycle in regions where the water reserve is formed in spring and early summer and demand peaks in summer. For instance, in California demand is highest over the summer period (June through September), when high temperatures trigger over-use of air conditioners and other coolants (for yearly …gures about power demand in California, compare the California Energy Commission Reports and Outlooks available at http://energyarchive.ca.gov/). Demand peaks at the second period of the water cycle in countries where the water reserve is formed mainly in spring, when snow and ice melt, and is used extensively in fall and winter, essentially for heating purposes. An example is found in the Scandinavian countries (compare Grønli and Costa [8] ). Similarly, customers in the U.S. Paci…c Northwest use more electricity in winter than in summer. Nevertheless, the Columbia River (the largest river in the Paci…c Northwest) is driven by snowmelt, with high runo¤ in late spring and early summer (about 60% of the natural runo¤ in the basin occurs during May, June and July; compare Bonneville Power Administration [5] Whether under open-or closed-loop competition, seeking pro…ts induces the hydro producer to supply a sub-optimally low quantity in the peak period so as to raise the marginal revenue. On top of that, in the closed-loop game, the hydro producer tends to use less water in the …rst period and more in the second. Hence, the above distortion is exacerbated if demand peaks in the …rst period, and it is lessened if demand peaks in the second period.
To illustrate this point and to derive precise policy implications, we take the ratio (A 1 A 2 ) =2B to measure "demand seasonality." 22 Demand peaks at the …rst period when > 0: It peaks at the second period in the converse case. If is close to zero, then there is almost no seasonal pattern. If (the absolute value of) exceeds S=2; then seasonality is so important that it would be socially optimal to allocate the entire reserve of water to a single period. This is, however, an extreme case that we have neglected throughout the analysis. We also let q H; 1 denote the hydropower supply in period 1; when the intertemporal pro…le of hydro production is chosen to attain the highest level of social welfare, given that …rm T maximizes its pro…t. Similarly, we let q Depending upon the speci…c value that takes within the relevant interval
; two di¤erent regimes can arise, one in which open-loop competition (i.e., long-term contracting) dominates (i.e., yields higher welfare than) closed-loop competition and the other in which the converse occurs.
The …rst regime arises when 2 e ;
; where
This says that demand either peaks at the …rst period of the water cycle or it peaks at the second period, but in a context of weak seasonality (j j small). Under these circumstances, hydro quantities in period 1 are ranked as q
if the peak is registered in that same period ( > 0). They are ranked as q
if demand peaks at the second period ( e < < 0): The former ranking is represented in the upper-right quadrant of the graph in Figure 5 , the latter in the area immediately below the horizontal axis. In either case, welfare levels are ordered as follows:
These inequalities show that the intertemporal water allocation in the closed-loop game ( ) for 2 ( ; 0) (weak second-period peak) and as q
(strong second-period peak). Long-term contracts welfare-dominate for 2 e ; results in a lower level of welfare, as compared to the open-loop game. Therefore, when demand peaks at the …rst period of the water cycle (or when it peaks at the second period but the seasonal pattern is weak), long-term contracts would enhance social welfare. The second possible regime arises whenever 2
; e : This says that demand peaks at the second period of the water cycle in a context of signi…cant seasonality (j j large). In this case, hydro quantities in period 1 are ordered as q : They are both associated with the following order of welfare levels:
These inequalities show that closed-loop competition yields a higher level of social welfare than does open-loop competition. One can thus conclude that, as long as demand peaks at the second period of the water cycle (and seasonality is "strong enough" i.e., < e ); the introduction of long-term contracts would actually lower social welfare.
The analysis developed so far shows that seasonality is policy-relevant when demand peaks at t = 2; whereas it is not when demand peaks at t = 1: The reason for this is to be found in the strategic structure of the closed-loop game. In the latter, by comparison with the open-loop game, …rm H transfers some water from period 1 to period 2; as to induce its thermal competitor(s) to reduce production in period 2. This contributes to exacerbating scarcity problems in period 1; and to alleviating them in period 2: Therefore, when demand peaks at period 1; a shift from open-loop competition to closed-loop competition unambiguously exacerbates the scarcity problem in that period. By contrast, when demand peaks at period 2; the same shift alleviates the scarcity problem in that period. However, if seasonality is weak, then the scarcity problem is likely to be of little importance. Thus, in the shift to closed-loop competition (i.e., when renouncing longterm contracts), the bene…ts attached to the scarcity reduction in period 2 may actually be lower than the costs induced by the scarcity raise in period 1:
One last point is worth noting. The insights we have drawn from the analysis are valid whatever the degree of competition in the thermal sector. Indeed, as previously pointed out, the absence of environmental impact within the linear framework is not related to the speci…c market structure. The fact that the hydro producer tends to supply a suboptimally low quantity in the peak period, is also very general and independent of : The same holds true for the comparison between the closed-loop and the open-loop intertemporal output pro…le. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the phenomena under scrutiny does depend upon the market structure. In particular, when the thermal producers are not endowed with market power and thus act as price-takers ( = 0), they do not account for the impact that a transfer of water to period 2 will have on the period 2 marginal revenue. Hence, ceteris paribus, they contract their production less than they would if they were to behave strategically. In the closed-loop game, this induces …rm H to keep more water in the …rst period and there is less of a di¤erence between the open and the closed-loop outcome. It also follows that the degree of seasonality e at which the switch from the …rst to the second regime occurs, is closer to zero when the hydro producer faces a competitive thermal fringe than it is when the hydro producer faces a unique thermal competitor ( = 1) : In other words, the less the thermal sector is competitive, the larger the set of circumstances under which long-term contracting appears to enhance social welfare.
The impact of long-term contracting on environmental damage
We shall now explore how the strategic behaviour of the hydro producer (i.e., whether or not output is sold under long-term contracts) a¤ects environmental problems. To this aim, we need to come back to a general setting, in which both welfare and environmental e¤ects appear. In this framework, one can identify a precise condition under which total damage is increased, as water is transferred from period 1 to period 2; by computing the marginal impact of water transfers on thermal production (see Appendix B). One can thus identify the precise conditions under which the introduction of long-term contracts leads to a reduction in environmental damages.
As far as the fully general case is considered, the aforementioned condition is so intricate that it does not provide much intuition, and remains of scarce practical guidance. In a recent study, however, Billette de Villemeur and Pineau [4] show that this condition takes a particularly simple form when the hydro producer faces a competitive thermal fringe. In this situation, environmental problems are especially strong as thermal …rms do not contract output as to exert market power. Arguably, given that the e¤ect of strategic water transfers on emissions are likely to be of a second order, this is the only situation in which the environmental impact of long-term contracting is to be accounted for.
Speci…cally, when = 0; total damage is increased as water is transferred from period 1 to period 2 if and only if D
where s 
This says that long-term contracting (less water transferred from period 1 to period 2 ) is bene…cial to the environment whenever the ratio of thermal market shares s
Whether condition (11) holds true is, in our opinion, mainly an empirical question. In fact, the pattern of market shares has no obvious link with that of equilibrium prices (or consumption). More precisely, one can easily establish that:
T t dp t = dq T t dp t q H t q T t dq H t dp t :
Arguably, when demand peaks, prices are higher and both hydro and thermal producers tend to supply more in that period. If the water reserve is su¢ ciently large, so that q thermal market shares tend to display an opposite pattern as compared to prices. The associated heuristic is that, ceteris paribus, when water is relatively abundant, both price distortions and environmental damages are likely to be reduced by long-term contracting in situations in which consumption peaks in the …rst period rather than in the second period of the water cycle. By contrast, when water is relatively scarce (and thus external costs potentially greater), price distortions and environmental damages move in opposite directions. That is, an intertemporal water transfer that exacerbates price distortions lessens environmental damages and vice versa. Given that environmental e¤ects are likely to be second-order ones, we believe that, in this latter case, the sole price distortions should be considered to appraise the opportunity of resorting to longterm contracts.
Concluding remarks
Two main insights can be drawn from our analysis. First, in hydro-thermal electricity markets where hydro producers manage a scarce water reserve that is naturally renewed over time, the adoption of long-term contracts can have either a negative or a positive e¤ect on social welfare, depending upon the intertemporal consumption pattern over the water cycle. Speci…cally, our results suggest that, when demand displays signi…cant seasonality, long-term contracts tend to reinforce price distortions (i.e., closed-loop competition welfare-dominates open-loop competition) as long as consumption peaks at the second period of the water cycle. On the other hand, long-term contracts attenuate price distortions (i.e., open-loop competition welfaredominates closed-loop competition) whenever consumption peaks at the …rst period. In terms of policy, this points to the conclusion that long-term contracting should be deterred in the former case and promoted in the latter.
The second insight is that long-term contracts are likely to have a minor impact on environmental quality, since strategic water transfers have only a second-order e¤ect on total thermal output. This result evidences that the exercise of intertemporal market power by hydro producers is not comparable to the exercise of "standard" market power that, rather, induces a …rst-order e¤ect. Neither does it work as a simple tax, which would also have a …rst-order impact. Because environmental health does not depend critically on the adoption of long-term contracts, pollution control in hydro-thermal electricity sectors does not seem to be crucial for deciding whether or not to rely on the latter. This also makes the di¢ culty less relevant in identifying simple and universal guidelines for assessing the environmental e¤ects of long-term contracting. Notwithstanding, our study does provide a practical recipe for appraising the marginal environmental impact in a case in which pollution issues are exacerbated, namely when the thermal sector is a perfectly competitive fringe. Speci…cally, this requires the use of data about the intertemporal pattern of (thermal) market shares over the water cycle.
We limit ourselves to study how the adoption of long-term contracts a¤ects the outcome of hydro-thermal electricity markets. An open question is how to design appropriate corrective interventions in order to decentralize the optimal intertemporal hydropower pro…le. This question is on our research agenda.
Hence, in the particular framework here considered, it speci…es as This is the value of q A.5 Ranking quantities and welfare levels
We hereafter provide the overall ranking of quantities. Once hydro quantities are ranked in period 1; the ranking of welfare levels can be drawn.
A.5.1 First-period peak:
We have q Because this derivative is positive, the value of
